A Right to Build

Most of the world thinks settlements are illegal. US President Barak Obama calls them "illegitimate." Defense Minister Ehud Barak casts his crusade against settlers as mere "law enforcement." Appeasing such sentiments, the government approved the 10-month freeze on Jewish building in Judea and Samaria. But while the world calls the settlements illegal, the ban on settlement construction may itself violate Israeli law and its protections for human rights.

The country's first law, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, is also its first law dealing with human rights. The Declaration states that Israel will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants, will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets, will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex. In the landmark case Kol Ha'am v. the minister of the Interior, the Supreme Court held that the Declaration was more than just a law - it was a law whose principles would be used in interpreting all other laws. This empowered the court to more strictly scrutinize and more easily strike administrative actions which violated human rights.

In 1992, the Knesset further entrenched legal protections for human rights, approving two semi-constitutional basic laws which stated that the basic rights of human beings are founded on the recognition of the worth of the human being, of the sanctity of his life and of the fact that he is free, and they shall be respected in the spirit of the principles in the Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Israel.

One of them, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, protects the right of "every citizen... to engage in any occupation, profession or line of work." The other, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, states that "the life, body and dignity of a human being must not be injured by virtue of the fact that he is a human being," that "a human being's property must not be harmed" and that "every person is entitled to the protection of his life, limb and dignity."

BY 1995, on the basis of the new basic laws, the Supreme Court controversially held in Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Village that it could review and strike laws approved by the Knesset. Right or wrong, that decision allowed Gush Katif residents and their supporters to seek judicial cancellation of the disengagement on the basis of the basic laws in the case of Gaza Shore Regional Council v. the Knesset. There, the Court agreed that the disengagement "infringes the human dignity of evacuated Israelis... protected in... the basic law."

The Court described how

the disengagement cuts the evacuated Israeli from his house, his surroundings, his synagogue, the cemeteries in which his dead are buried. It infringes on his personality. Indeed, at the foundation of human dignity as a constitutional right, "there stands the recognition that man is a free creature that develops his body and spirit according to his will... This right of a person to shape his life and his fate encompasses the essentials of his life, how he will live, with what will he work, with whom will he live, in what will he believe. This is central to the existence of every individual."

The Court further held that the disengagement violated the evacuees' property rights and their right to engage in their chosen occupations under Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

Nevertheless, the court held that the Knesset-approved disengagement met an exception in the basic laws for "a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required."

YET, DESPITE authorizing the expulsion of a particular class from an entire region, the court still affirmed that settlers have protected rights to their property, to choose their place of residence and make a home, family, community and life. This includes the right to physically accomplish those things - the right to build. The freeze violates that right exactly as the court described it. Unlike the disengagement, however, it was not approved in law and does not meet the above-mentioned exception.

In addition, there is the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, whose "spirit" the basic laws are supposed to protect. The Declaration speaks of the "natural right" of the Jewish people to "Eretz Yisrael" and approvingly how "Jews strove... to reestablish themselves in their ancient homeland," "made deserts bloom," "built villages and towns, and created a thriving community." That community extended beyond the Green Line into the heart of the "ancient homeland."

As discussed, the Declaration also calls for equal protection and development of the country for all inhabitants, regardless of religion and race. As a restriction on Jewish settlement, the freeze utterly contradicts both the democratic and Zionistic values of the Declaration.

In the final analysis, the question is therefore not whether the settlers have the right to build their houses, their communities and their lives, but whether that right will ever be vindicated by the government that violates it, or by the court which only recently recognized it.

Even for Gilad, this is not the way

[As published in The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 22, 2009]

THE PLIGHT OF YOUNG GILAD SHALIT, and the struggle of his family and parents who have worked so hard for his freedom, have captivated the nation. Never before has the absence of one person been such a personal matter for all of Israel. Yet, even for Gilad, who is still alive, there are lines that cannot be crossed and deals that cannot be made.

"Thou Shalt not Kill" is probably the most important rule for civilization. No society could survive long, let alone flourish, if men could kill each other without consequence. We therefore have a justice system, at the head of which stand judges, who are, arguably, among the most respected members of society. These judges conduct fair hearings and render harsh judgments against those who have taken the lives of other human beings. Their judgments prevent the killers from killing again, exact retribution in the name of the victims, deter would-be murderers and enable society to function normally.

The worst of those who take life are those we call "terrorists," who kill because they hate Jews and desire to terrorize Israeli society. Due to the heinousness of their crimes, our justice system locks away these "beasts on two legs," as Menachem Begin called them, forever.

Today, organized gangs of these murderous animals seek to overturn the rulings of our justice system by having hundreds of terrorists, among them many convicted murderers, freed. Hamas seeks to boost its standing as a terror organization that can obtain the release of prisoners and bring Israel to its knees.

ENCOURAGED BY Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, terrorists attacked an IDF unit, killed two soldiers and kidnapped Gilad Schalit, holding him captive for over 1275 days. They knew that with an act of such barbaric simplicity they could get practically whatever they wanted from Israel, including the release of their murderous comrades. They knew this because, unfortunately, this is the public policy Israel: to release murderers when other murderers demand it.

The Lebanon War of 2006, in which over a hundred IDF soldiers and thousands of Lebanese were killed, was the result of this policy. Shortly before the war, Hassan Nasrallah announced publicly (as was reported in Time Magazine, July 25, 2006) that Hizbullah would obtain the release of the child-murderer Samir Kuntar by kidnapping IDF soldiers. This kidnapping sparked the war. Two years later, the Olmert government traded hundreds of terrorists for the bodies of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. The Olmert government thought it were being merciful and populist. In reality it played right into the Hizbullah's hands.

Today, the Netanyahu government faces the same demand: Release a thousand terrorists in exchange for Gilad Shalit. But is this really the only way to obtain Gilad's release? Israel continues to have opportunities to obtain Gilad's release without sending hundreds of terrorists into the world. Israel could make Gilad's release a diplomatic imperative in which no discussion with foreign officials or press would begin without calling for Gilad's release. Gilad's release could be a precondition for continuing the construction freeze, for resuming negotiations, or allowing international aid into Gaza. Israel could resume targeted strikes on Hamas leadership in Gaza.

All of these actions, if done correctly and persistently, would force Gilad Shalit into the international arena, rally public opinion in the US to Israel's side and make his release a top priority for other international players who want to ease the Palestinian's suffering and resume the peace process, including US President Barack Obama.

Yet no such proactive steps have been taken. In Netanyahu's speech at the UN earlier this year, which was televised on major news networks in the US, Schalit was not even mentioned. The Goldstone Report, which was mentioned, is an important issue but is it more important than Schalit? Surely Netanyahu left Gilad out because he feared confusing the issues and ruining the chance to achieve other diplomatic goals, like defusing the Goldstone Report. It is this refusal to take the initiative which has left us with the passive option - releasing the murderers.

Netanyahu, who once harshly criticized prisoner exchanges, is surely taking into consideration the fact that some 80% of Israelis are reportedly in favor of the deal. If he concludes the deal, this 80% would hail him as a leader able to succeed where others (Olmert, for example) failed. But are Netanyahu and those millions prepared to take responsibility for the lives of the future victims of those released and any future "Gilad Schalits" who will be taken captive? For these are the consequences that will surely follow.

Releasing the terrorists may mean saving Gilad's life, but it also means that more Jews will die and more soldiers will be kidnapped. It means that justice can never be served even against jailed murderers.

Surely this is not the way for the Jewish state to conduct itself. Let us put an end to this dangerous and embarrassing policy of negotiating with hostage takers and releasing convicted murderers once and for all. Let us obtain Gilad Schalit's release without giving our enemies the opportunity to murder more Jews.

Ben-Gurion's 'Pragmatism' (Letter)

The following letter, of Nov. 25, 2009, was in response to the Jerusalem Post's editorial Principle & Pragmatism of Nov. 24, 2009.

Sir, - Your reference to former prime minister David Ben-Gurion's "uncompromising" pragmatism ("Principle & pragmatism," November 24) is somewhat puzzling, as pragmatism in politics is the art of compromising on values and principles.

Ben-Gurion did believe in supreme loyalty to the state, but only when he ruled it. His socialism meant loyalty to a non-Zionist cause - the cause of the workers - which hurt Zionism. He led a movement that promoted class warfare between Jewish owners and workers even in the still-developing Yishuv, hindering economic development and foreign investment. His party could not accept even the concept of national arbitration to resolve strikes. As for loyalty to Zionism, until 1942 he refused to declare a Jewish state as the goal of Zionism, even denying this before the Peel Commission.

Ben-Gurion and his movement led a vicious smear campaign against Revisionists because they were perceived as enemies of the workers, despite the fact that on all major issues - the need for Jewish defense, operations against the British, the need to evacuate European Jewry, the need to openly declare the need for a Jewish state, the need for illegal Jewish immigration - Jabotinsky was right and Ben-Gurion was wrong and would later adopt Jabotinsky's positions.

You mentioned the travesty of the sinking of the Altalena, in which Jewish immigrants and fighters were killed by Jews, which Ben-Gurion had the audacity to praise. But what about the saison, during which members of the Hagana kidnapped and informed on members of the Irgun to the British? What about the Arlosoroff affair, where two obviously innocent Betarim were accused by the Labor establishment of killing Labor leader Haim Arlosoroff, even though Arabs had confessed to the killing? And Ben-Gurion's refusal to bury Jabotinsky in Israel? Was all this laudable pragmatism?

Of course, Ben-Gurion achieved much for the State of Israel, but it's time we stopped glossing over his campaign against any and all who disagreed, particularly some of the greatest Zionists like Jabotinsky and Begin, as holy pragmatism - which is, as you point out, often a justification for unbridled ambition.

The IDF's "War on Beards"

By DANIEL TAUBER & DR. AVRAHAM GOLDSTEIN

Published in The Jewish Press on April 10, 2009.

An identifying mark of the Jew has been, and for many still is, his beard. The foundation for this is the commandment in the Torah: “You shall not round the corners of your heads, neither shall you mar the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27).

The Second Book of Samuel provides an early example of the importance of the beard. There, the Ammonite King shaves off half the beards of King David’s messengers to insult David. The messengers were so embarrassed that David instructed them to wait until their beards grew back before returning to Jerusalem.

Medieval Biblical commentator Rabbi David Kimhi notes that implicit in the story is the fact that the messengers’ other option – shaving off the other half of their beards – was too humiliating to contemplate.

The beard is also a sign of piousness and the wisdom that comes with age. The Hebrew word for beard and elder is derived from the same root letters of “Z-K-N” (זקן). In Jewish liturgy, the beard is a recurrent symbol when describing a pious or a wise man.

In modern times, many religious Jews would not shave off or even trim their beards, actions strictly forbidden by Hasidic and Kabbalistic teachings.

The Jew’s beard also made an easy target for anti-Semites. In 19th century Poland, then controlled by the Russian Empire, a government decree banned Jews from having beards and payot (side-locks). Many Hasidic Jews were heroically ready to face prison or exile rather than comply. Fortunately, a group of Jewish rabbis and community leaders convinced Polish and Russian authorities to annul the decree.

Despite the significance of a beard for many Jews, the IDF has initiated a “war on beards,” as a headline in the major Israeli daily newspaper Yediot Acharonot put it, announcing new regulations restricting the ability of soldiers to grow and keep beards.

Previously, the IDF placed no restrictions on a religious soldier’s ability to grow a beard. The old order (Directive 33.0118) states that “a soldier, observing a religious lifestyle, can grow a beard for religious reasons.”

Under the new rules, however, a soldier must obtain a recommendation from the Rabbi of his unit and then a permit from a Lieutenant Colonel.

If the soldier transfers to another unit he must renew his permit in the new unit. And, if the soldier shaves his beard or if he is tried for a disciplinary violation of the new regulations, he must wait a year before obtaining a new permit.

In the memorandum sent to all soldiers announcing the new regulations, Lt. Cl. Avishai Azulai explained that growing beards outside the regulations violates the “image of IDF soldiers in the eyes of the citizens of the state.”

These new guidelines place considerable obstacles in the path of a religious soldier wishing to observe what he considers central to his identity. They violate soldiers’ religious freedom. At the very least, they force the IDF to question soldiers’ religious beliefs and pass judgments on religious sincerity. How will the IDF pass such judgments? For example, if a soldier only recently became religious – how long must he wait to show his religious sincerity before growing a beard? If a soldier observes Shabbat and Kashrus, but not other mitzvot – is he sufficiently religious to grow a beard? What if a soldier is only traditional?

Having such judgments made by the IDF, in and of itself, requires state intrusion into a person’s belief system.

Further, there are no guidelines for the Lieutenant Colonel who issues the permit. He, sadly, may be hostile to or have little-to-no understanding of Judaism. As a result, soldiers in different battalions will face different and unfair requirements.

The requirements imposed by the directives are themselves no small obstacles, especially for young and impressionable teenagers. A soldier should not be forced to request official approval for and embarrassingly attempt to prove his religious sincerity to the IDF. As the Legal Forum for the Land of Israel, an Israeli civil rights organization, wrote in a letter of protest to the Chief of the General Staff on March 2:
“[A] soldier, especially a young or freshman soldier in a combat unit, does not easily approach an officer of the Lieutenant Colonel rank . . . for any purpose. . . . [T]here is a real concern that religious or traditional soldiers . . . will be afraid to obtain a permit to grow a beard under the stated conditions.”

The new directives also provide no exception for soldiers who only refrain from shaving during specific times of the year as prescribed by Halakhah. Those soldiers will have to go through an arduous process several times a year, and a Lieutenant Colonel who does not understand or even disdains the Halakhah may simply reject such requests. The Legal Forum therefore requested that the new directives be clarified to include such exceptions.

The mandatory one year waiting period before applying to grow a beard after shaving a beard is itself a judgment on religious sincerity. Here, the IDF falsely concludes that someone who shaves their beard once must not have a sincere religious motivation for growing a beard after that, regardless of any other facts.

The mandatory one-year waiting period imposed for a violation of the directives, implies that the IDF will use prohibitions on religious practices as a method of punishment for disciplinary violations.

As a symbolic matter, intentionally or unintentionally, the regulations send a message of hostility to the Jewish character of IDF and the State.

The IDF, the primary arm of the state, has immense social, political and even religious relevance to Israeli and world Jewry. For world Jewry, the IDF is a Jewish military, unique in modern history, the last line of defense against another Holocaust, the reversal of the Jew’s historical position as the helpless victim, and heir to the Jewish military tradition of antiquities. For Israeli Jewry, the IDF is a right of passage, a social training ground, where many form social, business, and political connections that can endure a lifetime, and society’s protector against terrorism and war. The enactment of new anti-beard regulations send an official message of disparagement toward traditional religious practices symbolized by beards, which Lt. Col. Azulai implied are not in keeping with “the image of the IDF.”

In any case, Azulai’s implied assertion that beards violate the IDF’s image is plainly false. Half of the young combat officers are religious and 40% of all graduating officers in 2007 were religious. Recently, Operation Cast-Lead produced many pictures of religious soldiers sporting beards, kippot, and payot, in uniform, sometimes in combat and often while praying. The religious soldier – beard and all – is, in fact, fast becoming the real image of the IDF.

In addition, many religious soldiers were very recently forced to question their assumptions about the IDF due to the IDF’s participation in expelling 8,000 Jews from their homes and barring all Jews from part of the homeland as well as recent threats to disband Hesder units, which combine Army service with religious study. The new regulations can readily be viewed as insulting, if not as a direct assault on religious soldiers.

But any public relations problems posed by the new directives to the national-religious sector are dwarfed in comparison to the potential for damage with Israel’s growing Haredi community, a large portion of which views the State of Israel and the IDF as anti-religious institutions.

Practically 100% of the Haredi community, constituting 11.5% of each year’s enlistment, does not enlist for IDF service for religious reasons. In order to reverse this problem, in 1999, the IDF, in cooperation with a group of rabbis, created Nahal Haredi as a venue for young, nationalistically inclined Haredi men to serve in the IDF while adhering to the highest religious standards. From a small unit of 30 soldiers, Nahal Haredi has grown into a full battalion with close to 1,000 troops, already aiming to grow to a fully operative infantry brigade.

The new anti-beard regulations, however, could set back the public relations gains made with Nahal Haredi. They will only enforce Haredi perceptions and arguments that the IDF and the state are hostile to Judaism. Taken together with newly proposed reductions in exemptions for Haredim, the regulations could spark even greater Haredi resentment toward the IDF and the State.

Lastly, the regulations are unnecessarily overbroad and arbitrary. Purportedly, they were enacted in response to data showing a rise in soldiers who grew beards in violation of regulations. But if this is the case, then all that is really needed is improved enforcement of the old regulations, not onerous restrictions which impinge on religious freedom.

A better rule would be, as the Legal Forum has recommended, to simply accept “a soldier’s declaration that he grows a beard on a regular basis for religious purposes or that he grows a beard temporarily for religious purposes.” Absent evidence that the soldier is lying, an onus should never be placed on a newly drafted young Jewish soldier to justify his religious sincerity.

http://www.jewishpress.com/pageroute.do/38854

PA Death Sentences Symbolize a Return to Arafat

[This article was originally published in The American Thinker.]

On the eve of former U.S. Senator George Mitchell's mission to Israel as U.S. envoy in the aftermath of Israel's recent anti-terror Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, a Palestinian Authority military court in Hebron sentenced a former member of the Palestinian Authority presidential security service, Force 17, to death for the crime of collaborating with Israel in anti-terror operations.

In two other instances, in April and July of 2008, a Palestinian Authority court in Jenin sentenced three other Palestinian-Arabs to death for collaborating with Israel as well. According to Human Rights Watch, Palestinian Authority courts have sentenced at least 11 Palestinian-Arabs to death in 2008 alone.

Thus, far from fulfilling its obligations to fight terror of its own accord or by cooperating with Israel, the Palestinian Authority punishes, in the worst way possible, those who do.

The courts' verdicts recall the extremist policies of the Palestinian Authority once practiced under terror-chief Yasser Arafat. Between 1994 and 2005 (Arafat died in November of 2004), the Palestinian Authority issued 74 death sentences. And this is aside from the numerous other human rights violations under his rule.

The issuing of the verdicts by courts of the supposedly moderate Fatah-run side of the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank") also parallel those currently practiced by the Hamas-run side of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. In July, a Hamas-run Palestinian Authority court in Gaza sentenced a Palestinian-Arab to death for informing Israel of the whereabouts of Palestinian terrorists, later killed by the I.D.F. In fact, during Israel's recent operation in Gaza, Hamas executed over 19 Palestinians and brutally tortured and maimed over 60 others whom Hamas suspected of collaboration with Israel. Just as Israel ceased its operations in Gaza and withdrew its forces Hamas said that its first order of business would be to round up collaborators.

In order to be carried-out, death sentences issued by Palestinian Authority courts must be approved by the Palestinian Authority President, currently Mahmaoud Abbas. The Legal Forum for the Land of Israel, an Israeli civil rights and government reform group, wrote to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak on Sunday, urging them to pressure Abbas not to give his approval.

"It is your moral obligation," Legal Forum Director Nachi Eyal wrote, "to clarify to [Abbas] that approving the sentence will have a grave meaning from Israel's point of view."

The section of the penal code of the Palestinian Authority which contains the death penalty dates back to 1979, when the Authority was still the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a recognized terrorist group led by Arafat which hijacked airplanes, threw a wheelchair-bound American citizen off the side of a boat into the ocean, killed Israeli athletes in Munich and committed scores of other horrific and murderous acts.

The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, in a press release regarding the death sentence, argued that the Palestinian Authority's use of the death penalty constituted a violation of international law and called on the Palestinian Authority to enact a "penal code that conforms to the spirit of international human rights instruments."

Before newly inaugurated President Barack Obama and his envoy Senator Mitchell even consider asking Israel to make security concessions which will undoubtedly enable terrorists to attack Israeli civilians and use rockets to shut down entire Israeli cities, they must demand an end to the obvious cause of violence - the official approval of terrorism and anti-Israelism and corresponding condemnation of helping Israel fight terrorism.

More than asking Abbas to merely not approve death sentences, the U.S. must demand that Abbas pardon the men and remove sections of the Palestinian Authority penal code which criminalize fighting terror in collaboration with Israel. Anything less would leave those convicted with a court approved stigma of evil for doing what the United States has been demanding for years and would serve as a deterrent to those who would otherwise assist Israel in the future.

Over the last 8 years, U.S. aid to the Palestinians totaled almost $2.3 billion, hundreds of millions of which went directly to the Palestinian Authority. Ultimately, and more to the root of the problem, the U.S. must seriously reconsider its funding of an organization which executes people for fighting terror in "collaboration" with Israel, names stadiums after homicide bombers or riflemen who target women and children, uses textbooks to promote anti-Semitism to school children, and whose constituency fired rifles in the air in celebration of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

As former Republican Presidential Candidate Senator John McCain said over and over during the presidential campaign, its time we stopped sending billions of dollars to people who don't like us very much. This includes - perhaps more than any other entity which currently receives U.S. aid - the Palestinian Authority.

Eyal made a similar point in his letter to Olmert and Barak: not only does the execution of collaborators with Israel symbolize a "return to the uncivilized norms that typified the rule of Yasser Arafat," but it "shows that whoever trusts the PA and gives it weapons and armored cars is behaving irresponsibly."

In Defending Jewish Identity, Sharansky Falls Short

Originally published in the Jewish Press, Dec. 10, 2008.

NATAN SHARANSKY is a modern-day Jewish hero. There is no doubt about that. Every Jew should know of his imprisonment by the Soviet Union for his human rights and Zionist activism. My father, for instance, gave me a copy of Sharansky’s autobiography, Fear No Evil, to use for my sixth grade book report.

Not without its faults, Sharansky’s newest essay, Defending Identity: Its Indispensible Role in Protecting Democracy (written with Shira Wolosky Weiss), is a welcome addition to Sharansky's last one, The Case for Democracy, which attracted the attention of U.S. President George W. Bush. As in The Case for Democracy, Sharansky again draws political lessons from his struggle with the Soviet Union as well as his experiences as a politician in Israel.

In The Case for Democracy, Sharansky argued that Western nations should idealistically strengthen democracies and weaken dictatorial regimes. He severely criticized the real politik school, exemplified in Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s policy of “détente” towards the Soviet Union.

With Defending Identity, Sharansky adds a “Part II” to a general philosophy for Western democracy. Sharansky once again breaks down the importance of a basic idea, which should be understood and accepted by all, but unfortunately is not.

Now Sharansky takes on the idea of identity, as in the identification of one person with a group, be it ethnic, religious, or national. Sharansky recognizes that democracy has some explicit weaknesses, such as a growth of pacifistic ideologies resulting from the combination of wealth and comfort which Western nations have acquired.

Identity, Sharansky argues, is the solution for this weakness. Identification with an idea of something greater than oneself, gives a person a reason to abandon a life of comfort and make sacrifices. Without identity, however, democracy can be weak, and could thus be beaten by Western democracy’s current arch-nemeses, Islamic fundamentalism, which is molded from pure untempered identity.

As an example, Sharansky relates the story of an imprisoned Palestinian terrorist, who witnessed his Israeli (Jewish) guard eat bread on Passover. The guard explained that he felt no connection to events which took place thousands of years ago, like the Israelites’ Exodus from Egypt. It was then the terrorist concluded that the Palestinians would ultimately triumph over the Jews because “opposing us is a nation that has no connection to its roots, which are no longer of interest to it.”

As for his own personal struggle, Sharansky explains that it was his Jewish identity which gave him the strength to resist the KGB and how only prisoners who had strong identities of their own could be relied upon.

Sharansky describes the leftist post-modern, post-nationalist and post-Zionistic assault on identity and Israel’s Jewish identity in particular. He shows these “post-identity” theories to be closely related to Communism, which preaches for a detachment from identity in the name of creating a classless, identity-less unified society.

Sharansky attacks proponents of post-identity theories for their contradictions and hypocrisies. For example, they criticism of Western nationalism, yet support anti-Western nationalisms of regimes that violate the human rights of their own citizens. During the Cold War and through today, this double standard functions as a political shield for regimes that abuse human rights. The Soviets, Sharansky recalls, used Western peace activists for their benefit, referring to them as “useful idiots.”

Armed with the argument that democracies must embrace their identities and defend themselves, instead of rejecting their own identities in the name of a post-national world without barriers, Sharansky takes on the case of the State of Israel, using his experiences in Israeli politics.

Sharansky tells how the municipality of Nazareth sought to renovate the Church of Annunciation by adding a tourist center to the Church. A couple hundred Islamic fundamentalists staged a protest, occupying the Church square. They demanded that the Church not be allowed to expand; that a mosque be built in its place; and eventually that this new mosque be taller than any other in the Middle East. The movement was only stopped when moderate Palestinian-Arab leaders secretly approached Sharansky, and asked that the Israeli government confront the fundamentalists. The government eventually did this on Sharansky’s advice and succeeded.

Sharansky lambasts several famous Israeli political figures. He criticizes David Ben-Gurion, for attempting to replace Jewish identity with a new Hebrew-“Sabra” culture.

He attacks Israel’s current president, Shimon Peres, a protégé of Ben-Gurion, for his embrace of the anti-Zionistic post-identity viewpoint. In Peres’s The New Middle East Peres claimed that the world had moved past nationalism, is concerned with commerce not national security and that Israel should therefore enter into a regional arrangement for security with other Arab nations.

Sharansky also criticizes current Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, for his generous offer to Arafat in 2000, as well as Ariel Sharon’s Disengagement. Sharansky relates how both Sharon and Barak tried to convince him to support their initiatives. Both argued that if the Arabs react negatively to their gestures then world support will turn towards Israel. Both arguments proved disastrously, if not obviously, wrong.

Defending Identity is an easy to read introduction to a hawkish Middle Eastern foreign policy. But Sharansky’s views suffer from some of the very faults for which he criticizes his opponents.

SHARANKY’S FIRST fault is his endorsement of a Palestinian state, which he makes clear in his book and his public statements. Though he always includes the caveat that a Palestinian state be democratic, this is just as naïve as the Disengagement and the Oslo Process which he criticizes.

Sharansky refuses to recognize that a democratic Palestinian state may simply not be possible or compatible with Israel’s survival.

Palestinians have abused every democratic right they have been granted. They use free speech rights to incite Jew hatred and murder in official newspapers, television, rallies; voting to elect terrorists; the right to bear arms to kill Jews and each other.

A Palestinian state would also discount Jewish identity and rights by barring Jews from portions of the Land of Israel. Sharansky opposes the expulsion of Jewish settlers to make way for a Palestinians. But all proponents of a Palestinian state advocate such an expulsion. Given this consensus, how exactly does Sharansky think this Palestinian state is to be built if not on the ruins of Jewish communities?

While Sharansky would probably admit that there are identities that cannot be allowed to thrive, like Nazism or Islamic extremism, he does not admit that the Palestinian-national identity threatens Israel’s survival. The core of Palestinian nationalism and its only unique characteristic is its extreme hatred for Jews and a desire to destroy Israel.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded before Israel reclaimed the territories, anti-Jewish pogroms began before the State was established, and Palestinian children are taught that all of the Land of Israel is Palestine – all evincing that Palestinian identity aims to destroy Israel.

Even if Israel could mold Palestinian society and identity to its liking and Palestinians accepted Israel’s existence, there is no guarantee this would last forever or even for a short time. It would be impossible for Israel to implement an “iron wall” against anti-Jewish elements in Palestinian society forever.

Even the civilized and cultured Weimer Republic, surrounded by other Western democracies, voted itself and its democratic ideals out of existence. All signs point toward even a purportedly democratic Palestinian state doing the same.

Aside from the danger posed by a Palestinian state directly, it will also likely be another terrorist satellite or launching pad for Israel’s enemies in future wars.

A Palestinian state would only provide a mechanism, even if democratic, for the murder of Jews and destruction of the state of Israel. Despite his various caveats on what it should look like, in endorsing a Palestinian state, Sharansky only legitimizes the very leftist agenda he protests.

SHARANKY’S SECOND fault is his failure to discuss what role Jewish identity, i.e., Judaism, should play in Israeli society.

Sharansky praises the role of identity in American society. But America’s diverse ethnicities are not interested in destroying each other, while Israel’s primary minority group seeks to eradicate the Jewish presence. While an American founding ideal is to create an inclusive immigrant society, Israel’s is to be a refuge for one specific people, whose identity is endangered by 2000 years of persecution and assimilation.

If Israel adopted the Jeffersonian “wall of separation” between church and state, as many Israeli secularists advocate, it would be impossible for Israel to remain a Jewish state. There would be nothing barring non-Jews from becoming citizens and eventually overrunning the state. There would also be no basis for its purported mission to serve as a haven for Jews.

Sharansky positively cites Theodore Herzl's Altneuland, which described a Jewish state where people spoke German and celebrated European culture. But this society was stingingly and rightly criticized as not being Jewish enough.

Moreover, as Yoram Hazony explains in The Jewish State: the Struggle for Israel’s Soul, Altneuland was a utopian novel composed for propagandistic purposes and was not intended to serve as a model for Zionist policy or the Jewish State. As Hazony demonstrates, all of Herzl’s other writings and actions emphasize his belief that Judaism was to play a strong role in the new Jewish State.

For instance, in The Jewish State, Herzl says that the synagogues “will be visible from long distances, for it is only our ancient faith that has kept us together.” Herzl wrote that every group of immigrants to Israel would have its own Rabbi as “we feel our historic affinity only through the faith of our fathers . . . .”

Additionally, while Sharansky criticizes Ben-Gurion for attempting to replace Jewish culture with a new Israeli one, Sharansky himself, at least in a passing comment, invites Arabs to “become integrated into the culture and history of the developing Israeli state.” This implies that the Israel will have a new culture and history apart from Jewish culture and it will be significantly influenced by non-Jews.

Sharansky says that he need not choose between his Jewish identity and Zionist activism on the one hand and his identity as a citizen of the world and human rights activism on the other. But Sharansky’s desire to simultaneously be an advocate for rights of all and the specific rights of the Jewish people causes him to falter. When it comes to the two most important contemporary issues for the Jewish people, the role of Judaism in Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state, Sharansky never goes beyond platitudes to which everyone can agree. But in the Hobbesian war for survival in which Israel is engaged, not everyone or every identity can come out a winner.

The U.N.'s "Greatest Failure" (is Ours too)

Published in The American Thinker.

GENOCIDE IN DARFUR (300-400,000 killed and 2.5 million displaced), aids in Africa (just under 24 million infected with HIV and 1.6 million dead), the Rwandan Genocide (800,000-1,000,000 killed), Communist China (1.3 billion living under a totalitarian regime), the rise of Islamic terrorism, the plight of women in Islamic and Arabic countries, and the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons and threats to wipe Israel off the map.

The world sure has a lot of problems and these are just a few. None of them, however, measure up to what the U.N. General Assembly President Miguel d'Escoto termed the "single greatest failure" of the U.N. - the failure to create a Palestinian state.

D'Escoto went on to accuse Israel of apartheid and called for sanctions and a boycott of Israel as was done to apartheid South Africa.

D'Escoto's speech came during the first day of a two day session in which the day the U.N. celebrated its International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. The Palestinian solidarity day is officially November 29 in commemoration and mourning of the day the U.N. voted for the establishment of the State of Israel.

The organization Eye on the UN reported that the U.N. was to hold an exhibit in its lobby with an entrance sign stating, "The Palestinians: 60 years of Struggle and Enduring Hope." (The 2005 Solidarity day included a map of Israel with a Palestinian Flag.)

The General Assembly President's speech and the Solidarity Day commemoration exemplify perhaps all that is wrong with the world today: It simply does not matter to the community of nations -

• That there are so many greater humanitarian crises that need immediate international attention;
• That until the Jews returned to Palestine, the Land was relatively desolate, comprised of desert and swamp;
• That neighboring Arab states have refused to absorb Palestinian-Arab refugees and have waged continuous war on Israel since its inception;
• That Israel has repeatedly made peaceful gestures to Palestinian-Arabs and in doing so knowingly jeopardized its own security in the form of prisoner releases, withdrawals, expulsion of its own citizens, providing the Palestinian-Arabs with weapons, money and infrastructure and yet Palestinian-Arabs have responded only with terror;
• That Palestinian-Arab society is producing a Jew-hatred that threatens to overshadow the Jew-hatred of the Nazis;
• That the Palestinian-Arab claim to a separate Palestinian state goes back only fifty years, may actually be in decline, and is too young to constitute a valid national claim to territory or political independence; and
  That the Kingdom of Jordan is a second state in Palestine[1], sits on land that was part of the ancestral Jewish state and is at least twice the size of the modern Jewish state.

The facts, the justness of the parties' claims, the history, none of these things matter. The only thing that does matter for the U.N. and the skewed world it represents is that the Israel must make more concessions to appease Arab demands. The concession here is the creation of a Palestinian state, which will be used to terrorize Israel, ethnically cleanse the region of any significant Jewish presence and thus put an end to "the 60 years of struggle" that began with Israel's creation.

But the blame for the rise of Palestinian-statism cannot be solely laid at the feet of the United Nations. This is because the state with the primary interest in combating this movement, Israel, has itself placed the idea of a Palestinian state on a pedestal.

Though the Oslo Agreements and Ehud Barak's generous offer in 2000 to give Yassir Arafat almost all of the disputed territories of Judea, Samaria (the "West Bank") and all of Gaza resulted only in Palestinian terror, even Israel's most hawkish figures persisted in worshipping the golden calf of appeasement.

In May 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon endorsed the 2002 Road Map, which called for the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005, and carried out the Disengagement from Gaza in 2005 in accordance with the Road Map.

Following Sharon's incapacitation, the next Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, worked from the beginning of his tenure to promote the "Convergence," which would effectively create a Palestinian state by unilaterally withdrawing from Judea and Samaria and expelling the Jewish residents therein. When his popularity dropped, Olmert abandoned the plan, quickly replacing it with traditional bilateral negotiations for the creation of a Palestinian state. Olmert's calls for Israeli concessions have only become more routine since he handed in his resignation.

Over the years, Israel has simply decided to give up fighting against the current. As a senior Israeli diplomat told the Jerusalem Post, Israel's attitude toward the Solidarity Day - and by implication the question of a Palestinian state - is that it is a battle which Israel "simply can't win."
Of course, the United States, Israel's closest ally, shoulders much of the burden as well.

As early as 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush became the first Republican president to endorse a Palestinian state when he said that "the idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision."

In 2002, despite his campaign declarations that he wouldn't set timetables for peace, Bush signed the Road Map, which as mentioned called for establishment of a Palestinian state by 2005. Later, Bush characterized Sharon's 2005 Gaza Disengagement plan "as an opportunity for a Palestinian state which is peaceful to begin to grow . . . ."

In January of this year, Bush persisted in pushing his "vision" of a Palestinian state. In a trip to Israel, the President predicted that Israel and the Palestinian Authority would conclude final peace agreements by January 2009. In complete ignorance of Israel's mission to facilitate the return of the Jewish people to Judea and to serve as a haven for a people persecuted for 2000 years, Bush added that the final "agreement must establish Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people, just as Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people."

It is particularly telling that as the U.N. celebrated its Palestine day and called for the creation of a Palestinian state, Olmert and Bush met for the final time the two leaders would be in office and touted their commitment to a Palestinian state.

And this trend will only continue with the upcoming inauguration of Barak Obama, who in June told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee that "the Palestinians need a state that is contiguous and cohesive and that allows them to prosper."

Until Israel and the United States recognize that a Palestinian state is more of a prescription for continued violence than a solution for peace and begin to battle Arab claims in the world arena, it is unlikely that a Palestinian state and the Israel-bashing it entails will ever be replaced as the top priority for the United Nations in favor of problems which truly deserve the world body's attention.

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[1] There has been much debate on this subject. Daniel Pipes, in an article in Commentary, argued that Jordan should not be considered part of Palestine. However, both the terms of the League of Nations Palestine Mandate (Art. 25) and the Palestine Order in Council (§ 86) make it clear that the land east of the Jordan River was part of Palestine, though the two documents (unfairly) allowed Britain to withhold application of the Mandate's purpose of building a Jewish state to those areas.

Is Israel a Banana Republic?

IS THE STATE of Israel a banana republic? The Israeli Left seems to think so.

After Barack Obama’s victory in the U.S. Presidential Elections, the Israeli political parties Kadima and Labor were quick to argue that Likud Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu “was too Republican” to work with Obama and therefore should not be elected prime minister.

Kadima leader and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said Netanyahu would put Israel “into a corner” diplomatically.

Labor MK Ophir Paz-Pines said that Obama would “try to advance the peace process from day one,” but “Netanyahu would say no to the Saudi peace plan, no to dividing Jerusalem, no to withdrawing from the Golan.”

[The Saudi plan, proposed in 2002, calls for a complete Israeli withdrawal from all disputed territories including East Jerusalem and the Golan in exchange for wide Arab recognition of Israel. The plan has been recently endorsed by President of Israel and former Labor Chairman Shimon Peres.]

“That's why it's so important that the center-Left bloc win our election,” Paz-Pines added.

In sum, the Kadima-Labor message to Israeli voters is to choose a leader who will defer to the U.S. President on major security decisions facing the State of Israel.

The Left’s assessment of Barack Obama’s goals in the region has merit.

Obama indicated in February that his Mideast policies may not align with those of the Likud. Obama complained, “I think there is a strain within the pro-Israel community that says unless you adopt an unwavering pro-Likud approach to Israel, then you're anti-Israel. . . ."

Former President Jimmy Carter recently told CNN that Obama would have a “new approach” and “promised to me personally . . . that he would not wait even a month after he was president to start working on the peace process.”

Carter contrasted this with the “previous two presidents [who] waited till the last year they were in office before they began the peace process.”

The British Sunday Times reported that during a meeting in Ramallah in July, Obama said that Israel would be “crazy” to reject the Saudi plan. (Obama’s Senior Middle East Advisor, Dennis Ross, however, calls the story “false.”)

Still, that Obama will pressure Israel is not a foregone conclusion. The pressing nature of the economic crisis and the responsibility of being president may alter Obama’s agenda. Additionally, a firm and convincing Israeli leader (like Netanyahu) may be able to convince Obama to respect Jewish claims.

But even if Barack Obama has plans for Israel that does not mean the Israeli Prime Minister must go along with them.

The U.S. and Israel may face the same Islamo-fascist Arab enemy, but the two nation’s situations and therefore some of their interests are vastly different.

Israel is a small country with a small amount of resources in the heart of the battlefield. Every Israeli concession to its enemies threatens the lives of Israeli citizens.

Far away from the conflict, the threat America faces is relatively non-existent when compared with the threat Israel faces. To many, the horrible attacks of 9-11 seem as merely a once in a lifetime event which will (hopefully) not be repeated.

As a result, Americans do not immediately feel the effects of appeasement. This means that at least in some respects, the temptation to make concessions is greater.

Too often that temptation translates into pressure on Israel.

Prior to World War II, British leaders were quick to appease Hitler by conceding the far away Sudetenland. Today, many American policymakers, especially in the State Department, are quick to advocate Israeli concessions to the Arabs.

Though the U.S. is officially Israel’s ally, it often aims to be evenhanded in its involvement in the Israeli-Arab conflict, equally weighing Jewish and Arab claims and interests.

Since Israel’s 1967 capture of the historically Jewish territories of Judea, Samaria, Gaza and the Golan, which are historically Jewish and control of which is necessary to Israel’s security, the U.S. has consistently advocated that Israel abandon those territories.

Such concessions – like the Oslo Agreements, Ehud Barak’s 2000 offer to Arafat and the Disengagement from Gaza – all resulted in more terror, war, and greater existential threats to Israel.

Although American aid is very beneficial, it cannot protect Israel’s citizens from the terror unleashed by Israeli concessions or replace defensible borders.

Thus, it is imperative that Israel withstand U.S. pressures to cede land, weapons and money to Israel’s enemies.

The Kadima-Labor bloc also misperceives the American public’s love for Israel and what led to Obama’s victory.

In every major poll throughout the U.S. presidential contest, Americans viewed John McCain, a supporter of Bush’s foreign policy, as the better candidate on national security.

Additionally, Obama found it necessary to repeatedly assert his pro-Israel credentials.

Unfortunately for McCain, other factors – the U.S. economic crisis; the historic opportunity to elect a Black president; McCain’s age; the initial lack of enthusiasm McCain generated among Conservatives because of his own liberalism; Obama’s oratory abilities; the historic amount of funds Obama raised and the media time Obama purchased – all weighed much greater than the issue of national security during the campaign.

The 2004 election was more of a referendum on Bush’s “war-mongering” (and pro-Israel) foreign policy than anything else - and the Republicans won that race.

What this all means is that Americans love Israel and understand Israel’s rational unwillingness to make concessions to her enemies. This is why the “too Republican” Netanyahu scores high when he, in his perfect English, articulates Israel’s situation to an American audience.

THE DEBATE about Israeli deference to a major power precedes the founding of the State of Israel. It is a debate that characterizes the whole of Zionist history, from the Balfour Declaration in 1917 until the Declaration of Israel’s Independence in 1948.

The two sides in the debate were championed by the President of the World Zionist Organization, Chaim Weizmann, who become the first President of the State of Israel, and Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, the founder of the Jewish Legion, the Haganah, many other Zionist organization and upon whose philosophies the Likud party was later founded.

Both Jabotinsky and Weizmann had a profound faith in Great Britain. But Weizmann and his supporters in the Labor party, like David Ben-Gurion, believed that British support was essential at any cost.

While the Jews of Europe were suffering mass social and economic persecution, Weizmann and Ben-Gurion did not have the courage to contest British concessions to Arabs.

These concessions took the form of disarming Palestinian Jewry in the face of Arab violence and barring Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Jabotinsky’s approach to Zionism was based on his belief in free speech, political activism, and faith in Britain as a nation. His slogan was that “silence is filth, it leads to a loss of life and blood.” Jabotinsky believed that Jewry had publically state its demands.

Jabotinsky demanded in the 1930s that at least 1.5 million European Jews be evacuated from Europe to Palestine over a period of ten years.

But Weizmann, who favored acquiescence and secret diplomacy, won the day.

In placating the British, who were in turn placating the Arabs, Weizmann and Ben-Gurion attacked Jabotinsky for his lack of discipline. They even went as far as to deny that the establishment of a Jewish state was the aim of Zionism.

In the end, Weizmann’s overestimation of the need to defer to British colonial officials ultimately contributed to the calamity of the Holocaust.

THE LEFTIST Kadima-Labor bloc does not understand that the essence of leadership is being able to withstand the pressures from major world players and to advocate one’s own national interests.

If the Prime Minister of Israel will not stand up for Israel’s interests, there is little chance the U.S. President will.

A review of controversial decisions Israel has made in defiance of the U.S., shows that such decisions have reaped benefits to both countries.

In 1967, Egypt kicked the international peacekeeping force out of Sinai, amassed its forces there, and blockaded the Straights of Tiran, all in clear preparation for war.

The U.S. urged Israel not to launch a pre-emptive strike. President Lyndon Johnson cabled to the Israelis: “Preemption by Israel would make it impossible for the friends of Israel to standard at your side.”

Members of the Israeli cabinet worried: Israel had never gone without the support of a major power. Chief of Staff Yitzchak Rabin argued that “If the State of Israel thinks its existence hangs on an American commitment and not on its own power – I have nothing more to say.” Transportation Minister Moshe Carmiel likewise argued that “[a]nyone who doesn’t think we can stand alone, doesn’t think we can exist here.”[1]

Fortunately, Israel did strike first and brought the war to a swift conclusion, saving countless lives, both Jewish and Arab.

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Jabotinsky’s protégé, embodied this principle. Begin understood that the Jewish people’s eternal national interests vastly outweighed the oft-changing diplomatic pressures from Washington or other powers that be.

After the Holocaust, when Britain astonishingly continued to bar Jewish refugees from Palestine, Begin led to Irgun Zvai Leumi in a revolt against British rule in Palestine.

The “Revolt” forced the British to return the Palestine Mandate to the United Nations, the successor to the League of Nations. This quickly resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel.

As Prime Minister, Begin continued to put his country’s interests first.

In 1981, under Begin’s leadership, Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak.

In response, the U.S. endorsed a U.N. resolution condemning Israel and withheld delivery of F-16 aircrafts to Israel. Secretary of State Casper Weinberger urged a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Israel.

In December of that year, the Knesset approved the Golan Heights Law, which extended “the Law, jurisdiction and administration of the State . . .[to] the Golan heights,” effectively annexing the territory.

The Reagan Administration was livid and suspended a Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation between the U.S. and Israel. In response, Begin called the U.S. Ambassador to Israel into his office and told him that Israel was not a “banana republic,” adding that “for three thousand years we existed without any ‘memorandum of understanding’ . . . with the United States.”

But the tensions proved temporary. The American-Israel friendship moved on and ties between the two nations are stronger than ever. One year after the passage of the Golan Heights Law, President Reagan issued a pro-Israel National Security Directive.

In 2003, President Bush praised the Osirak strike, reportedly telling the son of deceased Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon, who was a pilot in the Osirak mission, that he would finish the job Ramon started.

Begin’s actions set an important precedent. In September 2007, even the politically weak Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was able to strike at a secret Syrian nuclear reactor without any U.S. condemnation whatsoever.

It is not mere coincidence that such Israeli actions always have an ultimately beneficial affect on the U.S., while Israeli concessions have strengthened enemies of the U.S., like Hezbollah and even al Qaeda.

Kadima and Labor’s attempt to cow Israeli voters with fears of losing U.S. support is a shameful and dishonest exploitation of the American political scene. Israel needs true leaders like Menachem Begin who would never concede Jewish national interests in deference to the unarticulated and at this point hypothetical demands of an uninaugurated president-elect.

This article was published in The American Thinker.

[1] The three quotes relating to the Six Day War can be found in Michel B. Oren’s Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (2003) at page 123.

George W. Bush: Political Punching Bag

THERE WAS A TIME when people prayed for President Bush. But watching Oliver Stone's W., you would never know it.

Perhaps expecting anything else was naïve. I ultimately saw the movie only after glancing at a review in The National Review by Tom Hoopes, entitled, “Did W. Backfire?” Hoopes wrote that “despite the worst intentions of its makers,” the film “succeeds in making George W. Bush more likeable.” Apparently many reviewers felt the same, many of whom, Hoopes said “hated Bush going in — and kind of liked the guy when they came out.”

Well those reviewers must have really—I mean really—not liked Bush going in. As for Hoopes, for him to think that anything in the movie made Bush look good is utterly self-deceiving. The film goes so far to make George W. Bush look bad that it makes George H.W. Bush – W.’s polar opposite – look good. It presents Bush and his administration in the way the Bush-haters can only imagine the administration could be.

W. only begrudgingly acknowledges that Bush has the capacity to touch people. Bush gets along with his friends. He is likable in an asinine jock sort of way. In one scene, Karl Rove tells Bush that he is likable, but does not have a single accomplishment to speak of.

The film American Dreamz, which was not kind to Bush, is more truthful about Bush’s personal capacity for inspiring and connecting with others than W. There, George W. Bush, played by Dennis Quaid, is a judge in the season finale of an American Idol-type series. When a suicidal young veteran who caught his fiancée cheating on him threatens to blow himself up along with the studio audience, Bush attempts to convince him not to. As Bush talks, Dick Cheney, played by William Dafoe, says to himself in the background, “That’s my guy.”

W. is much less kind. Bush’s sole motivation in the film is not to do right for his country, but merely to show his father that he can make something of himself to prove worthy of the Bush name. Bush cares more about his dogs than anything else.

Everything Bush says sounds Neanderthalic. The camera excruciatingly zooms up on Bush’s mouth while chewing too many times to count.

In one scene, Bush visits a wounded soldier whose legs have been amputated and has a hard time speaking. Bush callously puts a tacky bright yellow “Operation Iraqi Freedom” t-shirt over the soldier’s chest. The soldier’s wife stands silently looking down as if condemning Bush but too modest to say so.

A particularly offensive scene had Bush talking to Laura while sitting on the toilet and wiping himself (a partial wall thankfully blocked most of the view). Gone are the days when FDR was shot from the waist up – at least for a Republican president.

This caricature of Bush the simpleton, perhaps good enough to be your buddy, but certainly not Commander-in-Chief, colors the entire film. And that goes for every other member of the Bush team: they are all unbelievable caricatures of themselves.

Karl Rove is a small nerdy conniving weasel who can only live through Bush. He accidentally calls Bush senior “pappi” and W. tells H.W. that Karl “sometimes thinks he is me.” In real life, however, Karl Rove is big and confident.

Condoleeza Rice is an automated yes-woman with a perpetual concerned look on her face.

Dick Cheney is an evil genius lurking in the shadows who manipulates Bush to implement his vision.

Donald Rumsfeld is insane.

Of course, Colin Powell is the righteous warrior and is the only person making rational arguments. He only gets on board the war to be a team player.

Aside from Powell, no one says anything that makes sense. Talking points and slogans that were actually used during press conferences as parts or summations of arguments are recited out of context in personal conversations or cabinet discussions. For instance, when discussing the opposition of France, Germany and Russia to the War in Iraq, Rumsfeld murmurs “old Europe.” Twice, Bush randomly states, “I envision democracy erupting all over the Middle East,”* as if he believes revolutions will break out immediately upon Saddam's defeat. In a discussion with Cheney, Bush tells Cheney to stay quiet during meeting because “I am the decider.”

Cheney speaks rationally, but he is evil. The result is that every argument put forward by the Administration for the War is simply ridiculous and invalid. Because slogans were used out of context, the characters themselves often don’t even seem to believe their own words.

At the end of the film you’d be surprised to remember that we’re actually winning in Iraq.

What made the film particularly lacking was that it skipped over the most important events in Bush's life: running for president in 2000 and leading the country honorably and inspiringly after 9-11. I remember people who mocked Bush’s “stealing” the election later exclaiming “Thank God George Bush is president and not Al Gore.”

The film omitted anything Bush ever did right – things that defined who he was. In the film, Bush never gave a campaign stump speech, something he was particularly good at. Never shown was the famous scene of Bush at ground zero surrounded by firefighters and other rescue workers, declaring “I can hear you, and soon the whole world will hear you!”

While 9-11 didn’t make the cut, Bush’s choking on a pretzel did.

W. was fitting for the campaign season in which it was released – one in which Bush was a pariah. Bush’s endorsement was anathema; Bush was conspicuously absent from the Republican National Convention – only appearing on a screen; Obama’s primary rallying cry was that McCain would continue Bush’s policies; and McCain’s most memorable line was “I’m not George Bush.”

It was refreshing, but more surprising that McCain had the political courage to open his nomination acceptance speech thanking “the president for leading us in those dark days following the worst attack on American soil in our history, and keeping us safe from another attack many thought was inevitable.” That was the first and last good thing said about Bush over the campaign.

Oliver Stone, not running for election, didn’t even have the political courage to include this fact in W.

So no, W. did not backfire. It made Bush look bad, real bad.

* This quote is based on memory of the film.

This article was published in The American Thinker.

Their Word is their Bond

IS THERE ANY PROMISE an Israeli politician will not break? It may be common knowledge that politicians lie, but in the last few years, this country’s politicians have reached new lows, breaking their promises on matters both large and small. Their word has become as solid as an appointment with the repairman the kind that does not inform you that he is not coming until he has already missed the appointment.

Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni who was recently elected leader of Israel’s ruling party, Kadima, and was thus given the task of forming a government coalition. After the religious parties turned down her “final offer,” for entering a coalition with her, Livni declared that she was “sick of this extortion” and would “draw the line.” Livni said that at 2:00 p.m. Sunday she would inform the President that she could not form a coalition, sending Israel to general elections. Livni’s advisors said that by taking a stand, Livni’s image would be improved for the elections.

But when reporters waited outside the President’s office at the scheduled time, they were told that the meeting had been postponed until 5:30 p.m., because Livni wanted to make last ditch efforts to salvage negotiations, disregarding that she had made her “final offer” and had “draw[n] the line.” Unfortunately for Livni, she still failed to form a coalition.

Israeli Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz also recently reneged on statements shortly after making them. Upon his defeat by Livni in the Kadima primaries, Mofaz declared that “[t]oday my family members and I decided that it's time for a break.” News services referred to the statement as a “political bomb.” Six days later, Mofaz made another announcement: He would return to politics in eight days.

Before becoming a leading Kadima member, MK Tzahi Hanegbi was a Likud veteran of 17 years and a settlement supporter. As a member of Ariel Sharon’s cabinet in 2005, Hanegbi voted against the disengagement along with Likud chairman Binyamin Netanyahu. In November 2005, after Sharon resigned as Likud chairman to form Kadima, Hanegbi was appointed acting chairman of the Likud. Upon assuming the chairmanship, Hanegbi said that “there are roots that can’t be uprooted.” But two weeks later, Hanegbi deserted the Likud and joined Kadima, saying, “Sometimes ideological matters are diminished, it’s a personal move.”

Similarly, in December 2005, after Sharon resigned from the Likud, Mofaz announced his candidacy for the leadership of Likud, promised to remain in the party, but then left for Kadima.

It should not be surprising that Kadima leads the trend in dishonesty (and corruption as well), as Kadima’s very creation was an act of dishonesty.

Kadima founder Ariel Sharon was for almost 30 years a proponent of settlements and decried their removal as “tyranny of the majority.” In the 2003 elections, Sharon defeated his opponent, Labor candidate Amram Mitzna, by attacking Mitzna’s plan for unilateral withdrawal from the territories. But shortly after the election, Sharon proposed and executed this exact plan.

Within the Likud, Sharon faced substantial opposition regarding the disengagement. Sharon thus called for a referendum to settle the issue, expressly stating he would abide by it. Yet when Likud members voted against the plan by a 20 percent margin, Sharon ignored the results and carried out the disengagement anyway.

After betraying long held principles and often made declarations, resulting in the loss of the support of his party, Sharon formed Kadima. Much of Kadima’s membership included Likud politicians who supported settlements and opposed territorial concessions such as Sharon, Tzipi Livni, Ehud Olmert, Hanegbi, and Mofaz.

BUT KADIMA’S coalition partners have carried their load of the dishonesty burden too.

In November 2007, Shas, the Sephardic haredi party and a valuable coalition partner, made it clear that it would not remain in the government if Jerusalem was negotiated. “Jerusalem is above all political considerations,” Shas chairman Eli Yishai said, “I will not help enable concessions on Jerusalem.” But for months Olmert conducted negotiations with Palestinian officials based on an agreed recognition that Jerusalem was one of three core issues to be negotiated. Shas officials remained in the government, lamely rationalizing that Olmert had promised them that negotiations on Jerusalem would be left until the end. When reports surfaced in February that Jerusalem was being secretly negotiated, Shas still remained in the government.

Similarly, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the official spiritual leader of Shas, went so far as to declare that Hurricane Katrina was a divine response to American support for the disengagement. Yet when Olmert, a principal proponent of the disengagement, was elected prime minister, Shas quickly joined his government, with Yishai becoming Olmert’s vice premier. After the Winograd Report on Olmert’s poor conduct of the 2006 Second Lebanon War was released, Shas had an opportunity for an easy exit. But Rabbi Yosef told Olmert, “Fear not, and do not be dismayed, for I am with you.”

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, the leader of the Labor party–the second largest party and the most valuable of Olmert’s coalition partners–is guilty of similar conduct. During the election for Labor's chairmanship, Barak made a campaign promise: “If on March 28, I am elected chairman of the Labor Party, and the prime minister has yet to reach personal conclusions,” which Barak clarified to mean that Olmert would resign, then “I will act to form a wide consensus in my party and with the faction leaders to determine an appropriate and agreed date for elections.” Yet Olmert did not resign until September 21, six months later. All the while, Barak remained in the government as defense minister.

What is truly alarming about all these examples, however comical and ridiculous they may be, is that they are indicative of something more sinister than politics as usual: an abandonment of principle and ideology, which has taken hold of Israeli society.

This article was published, slightly abridged in The Jerusalem Post.

Olmert's Parting Gift

HIS RESIGNATION already signed and submitted, disgraced Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is still selling the Land of Israel, piece by piece, to the lowest bidder.

The latest of Olmert’s giveaways is a $3.2 million piece of Jerusalem real estate known as Sergei's Court, which currently houses several Israeli government agencies including the Ministry of Agriculture, the Israel Nature and National Parks Protection Authority as well as the non-governmental Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel.

Prior to 1967, when the Soviet Union severed ties with Israel, Sergei’s Court was used as a KGB base.

Olmert, with his Cabinet’s approval, offered the property to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev as – what the one Israeli news service called – “reconciliation gift” during his trip to Moscow this week, and Israel has already begun proceedings to transfer the property to Russia.

In return for this generous gift, Israel will receive nothing.

Olmert seems to hope, however, that the gesture will warm Medvedev’s heart (or Putin’s) to reverse its more than half century long real-politik foreign policy of courting Israel’s numerous anti-American enemies and providing them with sophisticated weaponry and technology.

Playing down the gift, Olmert told the press it was merely “a small, symbolic matter,”

This description more accurately describes the Israeli bicycle uniform and a bicycle GPS system, Olmert gave President Bush in January at the start of Bush’s trip to Israel in January.

But Olmert’s characterization of the gift to Russia is more accurate when compared to his previous proposals.

When Olmert spearheaded the 2005 Disengagement plan for his boss Ariel Sharon, Olmert staked his career on giving away pieces of the country.

Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Olmert declared that Israel must unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank (or as Jews call it, Judea and Samaria), in a process he called “Convergence.”

Even in his last months before resigning he called for the division of Jerusalem and handing over certain of its neighborhoods to the Palestinian Authority.

More recently, he has even called those who do not wish to create a Palestinian terror state and return Israel to the pre-1967 borders once characterized by the late Abba Eban as “Auschwitz borders,” as “delusional fantasists.”

Olmert’s plans were only stymied by his own ineptitude in handling the 2006 Lebanon War and his own love of gifts, including an odd love of collectible pens, which resulted in several police investigations during his term in office, which led to his resignation.

But the relatively “small” gift of Sergei’s Court must be moved through wider lens.

Transferring the property dangerously gives a powerful sponsor of Israel's enemies a safe house in Israel's capital.

It must properly be seen as part of a larger pattern of Russia’s vying for influence in the Middle East. Russia is now renovating a Syrian sea port for its exclusive use as its base of naval operations in the Mediterranean. In June, Russia was given the deeds to three plots of Land by the Palestinian Authority. And now, Russia will have another base in Israel’s capital.

Medvedev’s statement to Olmert last Wednesday that Russia would “continue to play an important role” in the Middle East should not be taken lightly, especially given its past support for Arab wars against Israel, its support for Iranian nuclear program and weapons sales to Iran, arms transfers and diplomatic support for terrorist groups like Hamas, and its expected arms sale to Syria.

Just one day before Olmert left to Russia, Defense Minister Ehud Barak even accused Russian of destabilizing the Middle East with the Syrian arms sale.

Another problem is that giving away this disputed property for nothing in return may set a bad precedent for other claims made by the Russian, Greek and Catholic Churches for various properties in Israel, including the land on which the Knesset and the Prime Minister’s Office sit.

The Legal Forum for the Land of Israel, a conservative Israeli legal and lobbying organization has protested against the transfer, making headlines in Israel.

The legal status of the property has been dispute for decades, compounded by the split in the Russian Orthodox Church into Red and White branches, which only until relatively recently had competing claims.

The Courtyard was built for pilgrims by Russian Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, an influential member of the Russian royal family and for the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS) which he founded chaired. Alexandrovich was assassinated in 1905 and left no heirs.

Various governments who have had control of Jerusalem, the Ottomans, the British, Jordan and Israel have recognized various owners and used the Compound and the Court in different ways.

In 1984, the White branch of the IOPS relinquished all claims to property in Western Jerusalem in exchange for $7 million.

No one disputes that the Israel can transfer any of its properties, regardless of poor precedent and politics involved.

But when Olmert resigned from the office of Prime Minister, his government became a “caretaker” government. This means that Olmert only remains in office to ensure the smooth operation of the government, not to continue pursuing his own policies.

For instance, in 1999, Supreme Court Judge Dalia Dorner issued a preliminary order against a caretaker government’s decision to close the Orient House, which was a PLO base in Jerusalem. In 2006, the Supreme Court decided that a caretaker government could not even nominate representatives to religious councils.

No less than two weeks ago, on the Judicial Selection Committee, three Israel’s Supreme Court judges led by Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch blocked the appointment of new judges by the 9 member Committee – which only has two representatives of the government – stating that such an action must wait until a new government is formed.

The Legal Forum protested on these grounds and wrote to Israeli Attorney General Menachem Mazuz requesting that he advise the government against transferring the court.

Yitzhak Bam, a member of the Forum who is handling the petition, wrote to the attorney general that "[a] caretaker government is not entitled to take important and irreversible decisions” such as handing over "important property in the center of Jerusalem to a powerful foreign state with interests in this region and imperial designs.”

After the Cabinet approved of the transfer of the Courtyard on Sunday, the Legal Forum filed suit in Israel’s Supreme Court and its appeal is scheduled for October 12th.

Although the new leader of Olmert’s party, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni approves of the deal and is expected to soon replace Olmert as prime minister, it is not yet known what Livni’s government coalition will look like and what guidelines she will have to agree to in order to form it.

There is also the possibility that Livni will be unable to garner the requisite support to form a government, which will necessitate the holding of new elections in which former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the leader of the conservative Likud party is projected to win.

Olmert’s resignation was the ultimate consequence of the Israeli public’s demand – based on his many failures and disgraces - that he step down. By resigning, Olmert simply lost his democratic authority to continue pursuing his shameful policies of gifts and goodwill gestures.

Unfortunately, Israel’s judiciary is notoriously unsympathetic to the complaints of what it views as extremist ultra-nationalists who disagree with trading away their country and state assets for nothing in return. And, in the end, Olmert’s gift of Sergei Court to Russia will be the last in a long line of losses to the State of Israel during Olmert’s reign.


This article can also be found on the Website of the Legal Forum for the Land of Israel.

Hizbollah's Final Victory

BY EXECUTING the so-called prisoner swap with Hizbullah on Wednesday this week, the Israeli government concluded its shameful role in shirking its responsibility for the two Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hizbullah almost two years ago.

Far from being a fulfillment of the government's obligations, the deal is both a chillul Hashem (desecration of God's name) and the completion of Hizbullah's victory in the war it began with Israel in the summer of 2006.

This long episode in disgrace began when two soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, were kidnapped in northern Israel on July 12, 2006 by Hizbullah, shortly after another soldier, Gilad Shalit, was kidnapped in the South by Hamas terrorists from Gaza on June 25.

Prior to the kidnappings, Hizbullah leader Hasan Nasrallah declared that he would use captured Israeli soldiers as bargaining chips to obtain the release of Samir Kuntar, the sole surviving member of a PLO cell that in 1979 infiltrated Israel and killed three Israelis.

One of the three murdered was a policeman, Eliahu Shachar. The other two were Danny Haran and his daughter Einat. During a shootout with Israeli forces, Kuntar shot Danny in the back and drowned him to make sure he was dead, all while Einat watched. Kuntar then smashed Einat's head against some rocks and broke her skull with his rifle.

All the while, in a Holocaust-like scenario, Einat's mother, Smadar Haran, accidentally smothered her other infant daughter while attempting to quell her crying as the two hid from terrorists who were searching their apartment.

Following the 2006 kidnappings, the Olmert-led Israeli government launched poorly-devised military operations against Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

Up until the kidnappings, Olmert had been promoting his "convergence" plan, which was essentially the Gaza Disengagement to be carried out in Judea and Samaria.

Conforming to this policy, the army had been spending its time training to expel Jews from their homes instead of preparing for war like the one thrust upon it by Hamas and Hizbullah.

Israel's military operations ended in failure when Olmert bowed to international pressure in mid-August 2006 without obtaining the release of the Israeli soldiers or breaking either Hizbullah's or Hamas's hold on Lebanon or Gaza.

After the cease-fire, the Israeli government took no action to bring the kidnapped soldiers home.

For two years the soldiers' absence constantly hung over their families, as well as the entire Jewish people, many of whom included special prayers for the soldiers in synagogues around the world.

Now Israel has finally acted, approving a deal in which murderous terrorists will be released in exchange for the soldiers. The Olmert government thus broke Israel's latest lowest standard in negotiating with terrorists by agreeing to release prisoners with "blood on their hands."

One of those with "blood on his hands" to be released is Samir Kuntar. Shimon Peres, as president, was set to officially pardon Kuntar on Tuesday night.

Thanks to an outwitted and out-negotiated Israeli government, Hizbullah's leaders can now claim "mission accomplished" as they have achieved their final war aim: Kuntar's release.

Hizbullah Executive Council chief Hashem Safieddine characterized the deal as "proof that the word of the resistance is the most faithful, strongest and supreme."

According to the deal, the government will also free four other Hizbullah terrorists whom Israel captured during the war. (Hizbullah released a report on long-captured airman Ron Arad, but Israeli intelligence officials reportedly are not satisfied with the information it contains.)

Perhaps worst of all, the Olmert government did not demand proof the soldiers were still alive; in fact, Israeli officials had concluded the soldiers were already dead. Olmert told the cabinet before it voted on the deal, "As far as we know, the soldiers Regev and Goldwasser are not alive."

What the deal really means for Hizbullah is that in exchange for killing Israeli soldiers, more of theirs will go free.

This is not only bad strategic policy, it's a failure of Israeli justice. Those who commit the ultimate crime know there is a high likelihood that even if they get caught, they will eventually be freed.

Yoram Shachar, the brother of Eliahu Shachar, the police officer murdered by Kuntar, thus petitioned the Supreme Court to stop the deal, stating, "This isn't supposed to be my personal problem . . . this problem belongs to all of the people of Israel…."

Dr. Aryeh Bachrach a representative of the Almagor Terror Victims Association, which sponsored Shachar's petition, added, "We think this is an example of the collapse of the justice system, of the government."

And it's no secret what these liberated terrorists will do after their release.

Shachar predicts that "Kuntar is going to become even worse than just the right hand of Nasrallah . . . .This isn't just any terrorist. When he is in charge of a new terror organization, we'll say we're sorry that we didn't listen to the Shachar family."

Kuntar actually promised this to Nasrallah, in a letter published in the Palestinian Authority's daily newspaper al-Havat al-Jadida on May 30:

I give you my promise and oath that my only place will be in the fighting front soaked with the sweat of your giving and with the blood of the shahids, the dearest people, and that I will continue your way until we reach a full victory. I send my best wishes and promise of renewed loyalty to you, sir, and to all the Jihad fighters.

But a more immediate consequence of Israel's policy may be the conclusions Hamas, which is still holding Shalit, will draw.

If Israel will make deals for dead soldiers, there is no reason for Hamas to keep Shalit alive. Alternatively, if Shalit is kept alive, Hamas knows Israel will be willing to pay more for his release since it was willing to pay so dearly for the release of dead soldiers.

And Hamas has definitely drawn conclusions. The Jerusalem Post reported that Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar called Israel's decision

a major development . . . .Israel has agreed to release prisoners who it says
have blood on their hands. We must therefore seize the opportunity and seek the release of our prisoners . . . .There should be no difference between the case of Shalit and the case of Kuntar.

So why, after two years of doing nothing and having officially concluded that the soldiers were dead, did the Israeli government now act so hastily as to allow -- perhaps without realizing it -- Hizbullah to accomplish the specific war aims it proclaimed openly two years ago? And why would the government trade five terrorists for two dead soldiers?

Politics, of course.

No doubt the underlying reason for the deal was the desire to dispose of the political liability of having kidnapped soldiers still held captive during election season.

Olmert will face challengers in primaries within his own party as early as September. Shortly thereafter he and his Kadima party will face a general election in which, all polls indicate, they will lose handily to Likud leader and former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The way Olmert no doubt sees it, his having finally taken some sort of action on the matter of the kidnapped soldiers will make it harder for Netanyahu to hammer away at the prime minister for his inaction.

Hopefully, however, Netanyahu will not be deterred by what amounts to yet one more failure on the part of Olmert and his colleagues.

This article was originally published in The Jewish Press, July 16, 2008.